Introduction
The aim of this project is to address quality of service of QoS-OLSR routing protocol for Mobile and Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (MANET and VANET) taking into consideration selfish users that might over or under speed in order not to be selected as MPR. Mechanism design and repeated non-cooperative game theory were used to solve the aforementioned problems. We proposed a cooperative watchdog model that detects misbehaving vehicles by the means of Dempster Shafer (DS) theory. Collected evidences from all nodes are correlated to reach the final decision where in the literature the decisions used to be made based on one to one monitoring. Moreover, we had a novel contribution that is not only limited to VANET security but also to game theory. We have proposed a novel model to motivate nodes to behave normally after being selected as heads or MPRs. This is done by the means of Dempster Shafer Tit-for-Tat where in literature all the proposed Tit- for-Tat strategy depends on one-to-one monitoring to make the decision whether to cooperate or defect, while in our model evidences are correlated by the means of DS theory in order to reach the final decision
Contributions
Datasets
Dataset 1
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Dataset 1
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Dataset 1
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